Disable TCP Sequence Randomization
Each TCP connection has two initial sequence numbers (ISN): one generated by the client and one generated by the server. The threat defense device randomizes the ISN of the TCP SYN passing in both the inbound and outbound directions.
Randomizing the ISN of the protected host prevents an attacker from predicting the next ISN for a new connection and potentially hijacking the new session. However, TCP sequence randomization effectively breaks TCP SACK (Selective Acknowledgement), as the sequence numbers the client sees are different from what the server sees.
You can disable TCP initial sequence number randomization if necessary, for example, because data is getting scrambled. Following are some situations where you might want to disable randomization.
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If another in-line firewall is also randomizing the initial sequence numbers, there is no need for both firewalls to be performing this action, even though this action does not affect the traffic.
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If you use eBGP multi-hop through the device, and the eBGP peers are using MD5. Randomization breaks the MD5 checksum.
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If you use a WAAS device that requires the threat defense device not to randomize the sequence numbers of connections.
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If you enable hardware bypass for the ISA 3000, and TCP connections are dropped when the ISA 3000 is no longer part of the data path.
Procedure
Step 1 | Create the extended ACL that defines the traffic class. For example, to define a traffic class for TCP traffic from any host to 10.2.2.2, do the following:
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Step 2 | Configure the service policy rule that disables TCP sequence number randomization. For example, to disable randomization for this traffic class globally, do the following: |